Pavel Prigozhin, the 28-year-old son of deceased Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, has managed to preserve and revive a substantial part of his father’s mercenary and business empire. The center of this resurgence is the Central African Republic, where Wagner provides security for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra while maintaining lucrative interests in the country’s natural resources. The article’s central argument is that Pavel has achieved something his father could not: maintaining an independent power base despite a direct confrontation with Putin’s regime.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s once known as “Putin’s Chef” because of his catering contracts with the Russian government, he developed Wagner into a powerful private military force operating in Ukraine, Syria and several African countries. In June 2023, following disputes with Russia’s military leadership over the conduct of the war in Ukraine, Prigozhin launched a mutiny. Wagner forces seized control of Rostov-on-Don and began advancing towards Moscow before the rebellion was called off. Two months later, Prigozhin died when his private aircraft crashed. The circumstances surrounding his death have fueled widespread suspicion, although the article presents the bombing as the cause without establishing who was responsible.

The key surprise is that the Wagner organization did not disappear with its founder.

Instead, Pavel inherited a smaller but financially significant operation. According to Arms, Wagner maintains approximately 500 mercenaries in the Central African Republic and receives around $90 million annually for protecting Touadéra. The article estimates that its mining concessions, timber interests and other commercial activities generate a further $250 million. Gold is particularly important, while the article also raises allegations of tramadol trafficking, involving an addictive opioid. These are reported estimates and allegations, rather than independently audited accounts of the organization’s finances.

The significance of this arrangement extends beyond military security. The Central African Republic possesses substantial mineral wealth but has endured prolonged political instability and armed conflict. Touadéra relies on Wagner to protect his government against armed opponents, while the mercenary organization benefits from mining concessions and commercial opportunities. Arms argues that this creates a mutually beneficial but deeply troubling relationship: the president gains protection without the same political constraints that might accompany assistance from a foreign government, while Wagner gains access to valuable resources. The article also criticizes Touadéra’s removal of presidential term limits and his treatment of political opposition.

Another important point is Pavel’s ability to retain assets inside Russia itself. Although the Kremlin redistributed his father’s government catering contracts following his death, Pavel reportedly retained many restaurants, retail properties and apartment buildings, particularly in St Petersburg. The article cites an October 2026 estimate from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime suggesting that the Prigozhin family’s businesses generate more than $400 million annually. This is especially noteworthy because the Kremlin has frequently used asset seizures against individuals who fall out of favor with Putin. Pavel’s continued ownership of significant assets therefore suggests that his position is more complicated than a simple story of a disgraced oligarch’s family losing everything.

The struggle between Pavel’s Wagner organization and Russia’s state-backed Africa Corps is perhaps the article’s most important geopolitical theme. Following Yevgeny’s death, Moscow sought to bring Wagner’s overseas operations under greater state control. Africa Corps assumed control of operations in several countries, including Mali, Libya and Sudan, but Arms argues that it encountered much greater resistance in the Central African Republic. Pavel’s personal relationship with Touadéra, combined with Wagner’s established security arrangements and commercial concessions, has made the organization difficult to replace. In effect, Moscow’s attempt to consolidate control over its African operations has encountered a local arrangement that the Russian government cannot easily dismantle.